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REFINING TIIE LAWMAKING FUNCTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT
Frederick Schauer*

I.
In some contexts it is considered completely unthinkable to suggest
that the Supreme Court of the United States makes law, as opposed
merely to interpreting or applying the law made by others. 1 In other
contexts, including most especially the legal academy, denial of the
Court's lawmaking activity is considered conclusive evidence of professional incompetence. 2 But however obvious it may be that the
Supreme Court makes law all the time, we have ignored an important
ambiguity about the notion of "making law," and as a result have
paid far too little attention to an important aspect of the task before
the Supreme Court.
In the sense in which the "making law" notion is most commonly
used with reference to Supreme Court adjudication, the lawmaking
function is primarily backward looking. The talk of "making law"
occurs in the context of the sources of the norms for making the decisions in cases currently before the Court. The very fact that a case
is indeed before the Court means in most instances that the relevant
controversy has already ripened, and the task of the Court is to make
a decision between the parties in the existing controversy. To the extent
that its decision is based on norms not already embodied in authoritative
legal materials, 3 the Court is accused of, or praised for, making law.
But in another sense, the notion of making law .is forward looking.
• Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan, 1983-1984. A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
1. The best example of a context in which the Supreme Court is viewed as properly only
applying law made by others is the Court's direct interaction with the political branches of government, particularly the Senate on the occasion of consideration of a Supreme Court nominee.
See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Jnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 781-82 (1983).
.
2. Id. at 781; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980). Ronald Dworkin
denies that judges normally do or should make law, R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977), but I feel quite confident in assuming that Dworkin's model of adjudication would garner
little admiration from Senator Hatch, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 781 n.1.
3. The domain of "authoritative legal materials" is, of course, highly contested, and the
characterization in the text is intended to be neutral about the extent to which the text, original
intent, and other sources are permissible or mandatory sources of "law." This is the full field
of constitutional theory, and I do not wish to deal with those issues here. See generally J. ELY,
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For the Court makes law not only when it applies new norms to decide
actual controversies, but also when it sets forth a standard, or principle, or rule that is to be followed and applied by those to whom it
is addressed. To the extent that we expect others to follow the Supreme
Court's lead, and to obey its directives, then those others 4 occupy a
position with respect to the Court that is not dissimilar to that occupied
by the citizen with respect to a legislature. These others expect to be
able to follow the guidance of the Supreme Court, and it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the demands made by the citizenry on
its legislatures in terms of the process of setting forth directives are
or should be paralleled by the demands made on the Supreme Court
by those who must heed it.
In this Article, I will address this second type of lawmaking. I want
to explore the ways in which the Supreme Court, in its opinions, 5 does
and can guide the conduct of lower courts, legislatures, government
agencies, government employees, and the public at large. Each of these
groups, and others, is likely at times to have some direct need to know
what the law is. And to the extent that part of our law is set forth
in the opinions of the Supreme Court, this aspect of the craft of lawmaking should not be ignored. Although it is common in academic
discourse and classroom discussions in law schools to emphasize the
weaknesses in Supreme Court opinions, this is a luxury not available
to the conscientious lower court judge, legislator, head of an executive
department, or cop on the beat. The people occupying these roles may
not be totally unconcerned with whether the law is right or wrong,
but they have a much more direct concern with simply knowing what
supra note 2; Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981);
Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
4. The text is deliberately vague about who those "others" are, because much of this article
deals with the various groups - lower courts, legislative bodies, public agencies and officials,
the general public - that might constitute the class of "others."
5. A related issue is the extent to which the_ Court exercises its influence by means other
than its opinions. In many respects it is not what the Court says that is important, but what
the newspapers and television news stories say the Court said. The dynamics of this process
are beyond the scope of what I can plausibly do in this Article, but it seems clear that the factor
of popular interpretation of Court opinions is not an irrelevant factor in the guidance process.
For example, the necessity of the corrective decision of Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974),
is accountable far more to the misreporting of the notion of local community standards in obscenity
prosecutions in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), than to anything that can be found
in Miller itself.
Similar considerations relate to the Court's "nondecisions." It is technically true that denials
of certiorari are not decisions on the merits and have no precedential value. Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);
Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (1979). But that is not
the same thing as saying that they may not serve to channel behavior; on the contrary, denials
of certiorari may influence behavior, either because lawyers perceive the Court as unwilling to
review an issue, or because denials of certiorari are publicly reported in the press as "upholding"
the decision below.
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the law is. 6 When the law that governs them emanates from the Supreme
Court, the effectiveness of Supreme Court lawmaking depends on the
ability of the Court to perform its role in the process. Consequently,
the guidance function of the Court deserves close scrutiny.
The process I want to explore is not isolated. It exists in every Supreme
Court opinion that might have to be interpreted and followed by some
other actor or entity. But this does not mean that the importance of
the lawmaking function cannot vary considerably from case to case.
The decision of a contested boundary dispute between two states is
unlikely seriously to implicate the full range of potential problems
associated with the Supreme Court's promulgation of norms to govern
future conduct. But consider, by contrast, Miranda v. Arizona.' The
most striking facet of a Miranda warning is that a police officer,, one
of hundreds of thousands similarly situated, is in effect reading directly
from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In some
sense there is a "chain of command," or at least a chain of review,
between the police officer and the Justices of the Supreme Court. There
are police supervisors and commissioners, who in turn are under the
direction of various state and local political subdivisions, which in turn
are subject to the decisions of state and federal trial courts, and these
courts are subject to the control of appellate courts, which are, finally 1
under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The fascinating thing about a Miranda warning is that the decision
in Miranda leapfrogs every single one of these intermediate points in
the chain of review and the chain of direction and control. In Miranda,
the Justices are speaking directly to the cop on the beat.
A somewhat different example of the same process exists with respect
to the relevant constitutional standards sufficient to convict on obscenity
charges. 8 Miller v. Ca/ifornia 9 is not only the decision in the litigation
between Marvin Miller and the People of the State of California, and
it not only contains general statements by the Supreme Court about
the ways in which the definition of obscenity is constrained by first
amendment considerations, but it also announces virtually exact instructions to be given to juries in obscenity cases. Miller is not only
Supreme Court opinion, but formbook as well, speaking directly and
unequivocally to every trial judge in the country. 10
In other instances the Court is talking to smaller or different

6. See generally H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88, 132-44 (1961).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Miller v.- California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
9. 413 U.S. at 24-25.
10. There is, of course, no necessity that jury instructions, or statutes, be direct quotations
from Miller or any other Supreme Court opinion. But such a use of a Court opinion is undoubtedly the safest course, and it is thus inevitable that it will be followed.
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audiences. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 11 and
Powell v. McCormack, 12 for example, the Court is speaking directly
to Congress, telling it how it must legislate or conduct its internal affairs
in the future. In Reynolds v. Sims 13 and Avery v. Midland County, 14
the Court is talking directly to state and local legislative bodies, telling
them how they must apportion their representation to stay within the
mandates of the equal protection clause. And, most commonly of all,
the Court is talking to other courts, providing not only direction but
mandate as well, as lower trial and appellate courts apply the rulings
of the Supreme Court to the cases before them. 15
In each of these instances someone is following the directions of
the Supreme Court. But how good a director is the Court? How can
it ber.t perform the function of directing? What are the costs to the
Court's other functions if it emphasizes or overemphasizes the directing
function? Addressing this group of questions is my task here, but merely
pointing out that they exist may be sufficient to justify this endeavor.
II.

The lawmaking or directing function that I am discussing is in no
way peculiar to the Supreme Court of the United States. The task of
guidance is performed by all appellate courts and by any other decisionmaking entity that writes opinions when it makes a decision. 16 Nevertheless, I want to focus on the Supreme Court here for several reasons,
only one of which is that Supreme Court adjudication of constitutional
issues happens to be my primary area of interest.
Apart from my desire to write about what I know best, concentration on the Supreme Court, at least in this initial exploration of the
topic, seems to make sense. By virtue of being at the apex of the judicial
pyramid, the Supreme Court's directives bind the greatest number of
other entities. Thus, the impact of Supreme Court deficiency in issuing
these directives is likely to be the greatest. Moreover, the issues decid11. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
12. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding existing Alabama apportionment scheme and proposed plans
constitutionally invalid because neither legislative house is or would be apportioned on a population
basis).
14. 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that local units with general governmental power over an
entire geographic area may not, consistently with the equal protection clause, be apportioned
among single-member districts of substantially unequal population).
15. I reject any form of extreme Legal Realism that would deny that lower court judges
can be and are in fact influenced and usually controlled by the collection of symbols that we
call binding precedent. For my reasons for reaching this conclusion, see Schauer, Easy Cases,
58 So. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming).
16. We should not ignore the extent to which labor arbitrators, hearing officers, administrative
tribunals, and many other bodies write opinions that serve as a basis for guidance by others.
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ed by the Supreme Court are almost exclusively issues of public law.
Although private parties undoubtedly have an interest in knowing what
the law is in order that they may best order their private transactions,
the nature of the common law process is such that we have made the
decision that judicial guidance to future private parties, albeit useful,
is in the long run less important than the advantages of case-by-case
adjudication with a slow and often sputtering development of general
principles. 11 These assumptions qf the common law method are not
immune from reconsideration, but such a task is well beyond the more
modest goals I set for myself here.
In the area of public law, however, it is likely that the considerations are different. Because a judicial decision with respect to the
activities of a governmental agency can affect every person within the
potential control of that agency, the consequences of a failure to guide
that agency are considerably more widespread. Moreover, with respect
to constitutional constraints on governmental action, tllere is a sense
in which it is especially troubling that government might not know
what is constitutionally required of it. Thus, the kinds of issues decided
by the Supreme Court may be different in kind as well as in general
importance from those decided by other courts, and focusing this inquiry on the Supreme Court may offer special insights.
Finally, the Supreme Court is a peculiarly public institution. Its opinions are a matter of public as well as professional legal scrutiny, and
it is quite often speaking to the nation as a whole as much as it is
speaking particularly to those who might have to follow its decisions.
As a result, its audience is always, albeit indirectly, the entire population, and its ability to direct is of great political as well as more narrowly legal importance.

III.
The case or controversy requirement 18 has the effect of ensuring that
judicial lawmaking will not occur except as it is at least prompted by
an act of adjudication. But the fact that adjudication of the rights
of specific parties and lawmaking in the instant sense inevitably occur
in tandem should not cause us to forget that they are two quite different functions.
In the strictest sense an act of adjudication can take place even though
no opinion at all is offered. The adjudicator listens to the parties, decides
who wins, and announces the result. This is what happens all the time
17. See generally G. CAI.ABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THB AGE oF STATUTES
Co1U11c1C, LEGAL REAsoNING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

(1982); N. MAc-
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in lower courts and is in fact becoming increasingly prevalent in appellate courts. 19 Although providing reasons for a decision is often considered a central part of the notion of due process of law, 20 reasons
that are provided in compliance with this requirement are still being
provided solely for the benefit of the parties before the court. As a
result, an opinion issued solely from an adjudicatory perspective can·
be exclusively related to the particular circumstances and issues before
the court.
In contrast, there is no reason that lawmaking need take place in
the context of a ripe dispute between opposing parties. Legislative
promulgation of norms, although inevitably inspired by particular
factual assumptions and specific events thought to require legislative
reaction, still takes place in a setting divorced from the necessity of
deciding a specific controversy between designated parties. The process by which a particular institution announces a directive to be followed
by others is a process that can and frequently (indeed, most commonly) does occur in settings in which there are no specific winners
or losers. Lawmaking, qua lawmaking, is therefore distinct from the
process of adjudication.
All of"this is so commonplace as to approach the trivial. Yet it is
necessary to restate the obvious in order to set the stage for the problem. For the difficulty .we. confront is that the Supreme Court is inevitably charged with the task, in each case, of both adjudicating and
lawmaking. To the extent that it promulgates norms for the guidance
of lower courts, legislatures, executive departments, public employees,
and the public, the Court is exercising the lawmaking function, yet
it is forced to do so in the setting and under conditions primarily designed for the distinct function of adjudication. Because of its primary
design for adjudication - the Supreme Court is, after all, a court commentary on the performance of the Court has tended to focus on
the adjudicatory function, and perhaps the reasoning process as well,
but not on the ability of the product of the Court's work to establish
effectively norms that can be followed by others. 21
The primary source of the analytical difficulty, however, is not that
adjudication and lawmaking are two distinct functions. Rather, it is
that those two functions are in inevitable tension with each other, tension
19. See generally Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 573 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
21. I have noted the issue previously. Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum:
Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1919 SUP. CT. REv. 217, 217-18. The issue is dealt
with in some more detail in Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv.
802, 807-11 (1982); see also Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974);
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127.
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that verges on inconsistency. The process of lawmaking is a process
of establishing a rule. 22 And in establishing a rule, the rule maker uses.
the rule to exclude certain factors from consideration in the future while
at the same elevating certain other factors to special importance. 23 The
lawyers' "facts of the case," after all, are not all of the facts that
are related to the transaction before a court. They are only those facts
that a legal rule, established prior to the event, has deemed will be
legally relevant in determining the rights and duties arising out of the
transaction. 24 But a legal rule, excluding all but certain designated facts
from consideration, precedes in time the events that it governs. Thus,
the formulation of the rule is at best a prediction. It is an assessment,
in advance, of what facts are likely to exist, of which of those facts
we wish to control, and of which of those facts we wish to exclude
from consideration by the decision maker. But because the formulation of the rule is in this sense only a prediction, and because our predictions, lacking omniscience, 25 may be incorrect, the process of lawmaking, or rule formulation, is inevitably coarse. It excludes from future
consideration facts that might be important in the future but that we
cannot foresee today. To deal with future conduct by rule, therefore,
entails the risk of being precluded from considering certain facts that
we would, ideally, wish· to take into acount in reaching a decision in
the -case at hand.
To the extent that we can stylize and idealize the adjudicative
function, 26 however, the idea of excluding certain facts from consideration may disable us from reaching the ideal solution in the individual
case before the adjudicator. If we seek to be most just in the particular case, to achieve the optimal result in each case, we should not,
in advance and with imperfect knowledge of the future, exclude certain potentially important factors from our consideration. To constrict
the relevant context of adjudication entails a substantial risk of deflection of results from the optimal. Because the process of laying down
relatively clear strictures for the future involves doing just that, the
consequence is that exercising the lawmaking function inevitably detracts
from optimal exercise of the adjudicative function. This does not mean
22. I use "rule" here in a quite loose sense, and I do not mean to distinguish rules from
principles or other sorts of standards.
23. It is by his choice of the material facts that the judge creates the law •... To
ignore his choice is to miss the whole point of the case. Our system of precedent becomes
meaningless if we say that we will accept his conclusion but not his view of the facts.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 169 (1930); see also
G. GoTrtIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 46 (1968).
24. G. OornJEB, supra note 23.
25. See H. HART, supra note 6, at 125-26.
26. Adjudication serves many purposes, and the relationship among them is complex. Here
I am artificially narrowing the adjudicative function to ignore a wide range of interests other
than those of achieving the best resolution of a dispute involving only two parties.
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that some accommodation between these competing goals is not possible. It means only that we must realize that they are competing, and
that any increase in one must come at the expense of the other.
IV.

In addition to the tension between the adjudicative and lawmaking
functions, there is the tension between the desire to achieve the correct, or at least optimal, result, and the desire to provide guidance
to lower courts and others. To the extent that the Court resolves quickly
and clearly an issue of concern, it heeds its lawmaking function, but
possibly at the cost of a less than perfect resolution of that issue. Ideally,
in terms of achieving the best result, the Court ought to delay decision
until a number of different factual circumstances have presented
themselves in the lower courts. In formulating a rule, the rule-making
body attempts to imagine at least a fairly extensive sample of the types
of situations that are likely to arise under the rule. To the extent the
decision maker's imagination or foresight diverges from the reality that
in fact occurs, the rule represents an imperfect fit between the desires
of the rule maker and the results obtained by application of the rule.
Thus, if the rule maker can in fact substitute observation for guesswork
by examining a fair sample of factual situations before formulating
a rule, the risk of imperfect fit is reduced, and the rule is more likely
to achieve the results desired by the decision maker.
Similar considerations provide at least part of the foundation for
the case or controversy requirement of Article III. 21 The requirements
of standing, ripeness, and mootness, in addition to providing an adversary presentation of issues, also ensure that the Court is considering
the formulation of a rule in the context of real facts. Although the
factual situation then before the Court cannot necessarily be ta~en to
be representative of the types of cases that will arise in application
of the rule, one is still better than none, and the presence of a ripe
controversy seems better than issuance of a merely advisory opinion
without any concrete facts at all. 28
Whatever the justifications for the Article III requirements, 29 they
serve as a barrier to the exercise of the lawmaking function even when
exercise of that function seems necessary. Yet apart from the Article
III constraints, the various other decision-avoiding devices - pruden27. • See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979).
28. United States v. Fruehauf, 36S U.S. 146 (1961). See generally Field, The Advisory
Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).
29. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 27; Monaghan, supra note 28.
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tial considerations, 30 the "passive yirtues, m, the Ash wander rules 32 all spring from a desire to achieve a "correct" .result rather than a
desire to provide guidance. For whenever the Court avoids deciding
a case, or avoids deciding the central issue in a case, the law in that
area remains uncertain. And when the law remains uncertain, there
is no guidance from an authoritative source for those who genuinely
wish to do what the law requires. It is certainly not always true that
it is less important that issues be decided correctly than that they be
decided at all, 33 but it is an admonition that should not be ignored
completely. Some.issues, even some of those decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, are less momentous than others. Some areas
of Supreme Court adjudication do not involve fundamental decisions
regarding the course of the law or the course of life. In these areas,
therefore, it is less vital that every effort be made to ensure that no
decision is issued unless and until the "correct" result can be achieved.
Consequently, the relative importance of certainty and predictability
in many areas may be values that have recently been undervalued.
In a way, the issue of decision-avoidance is peripheral to my primary
theme of Supreme Court guidance in those cases it does decide. But
decision-avoidance in part implicates many of the same themes. For
when the Court fails to decide an issue at all, it may, in many cases,
be failing to perform adequately or may simply be abdicating its
guidance function. This is not, of course, always the case. When the
Court fails to decide the "good faith" exception issue in Illinois v.
Gates, 34 for example, it does nothing more than leave in place an existing
body of Supreme Court precedent. 3S Failure to decide a particular case
is not a failure of guidance if guidance already exists.
In other situations, such as Princeton University v. Schmid, 36 the
issues may arise sufficiently rarely that a failure to address the merits
of the controversy entails few costs. But where the amount of lower
court litigation indicates a recurring problem of considerable uncertainty, as with the "nativity scene" issue finally before the Court, 37
failure to decide the issue perpetuates a state of uncertainty. This is
30. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See generally LeBel, Standing
After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework For Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013.
31. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
32. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 {1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
•
33. See w. MUEID., THE ROAD TO PERSUASION 241 (1956).
34. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
35. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction ·because university regulation, allegedly violative of first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights, changed during pendency
of appeal).
37. Lynch v. Donnelly, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1766 (1983)
(No. 82-1256).
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not to say that the extent of a rule's uncertainty ought to be dispositive.
It is, after all, desirable for the Court to reach the optimal result, and
many of the techniques of decision-avoidance are designed to achieve
this goal. Moreover, broader issues of Court legitimacy, power, and
effectiveness may militate in favor of avoiding hearing a case or avoiding
deciding it on the merits. 38 But achieving these goals, however laudable
they may be, imposes a price when a failure to decide constitutes a
failure to issue directives to those who are then in need of direction.
Recognition of the inherent tension between the values served by
decision-avoidance and the Court's guidance function implies nothing
about the resolution of competing goals in any particular case. But
we must recognize that there are competing goals, and that decisionavoidance may often exact a high price that is not immediately apparent if we focus only on the Supreme Court in isolation. 39

V.
Putting aside the question of decison-avoidance, my central concern
is the process of issuing directives, of lawmaking, in those cases that
the Court does decide. And at this point not only do I wish to put
aside the question of decision-avoidance, but I also want to avoid the
question of which way a case should be decided. Although strategic
as well as substantive considerations may at times influence or even
dictate the outcome of a case, 40 that is not my concern here. I shall
take the broad contours of any particular decision as given and assume
that the Court has determined what the outcome of the case is to be,
and what, in very broad terms, justifies that outcome. The question,
then, is, How should the Court formulate the result, the rule, and the
opinion in light of recognition of its duty to provide leadership to those
who must follow that opinion? There is no clear answer to this question, and the considerations will vary from case to case. So what I
want to do here is to identify some of those considerations and the
ways in which they will be a function of particular features of the case
before the Court.
The Court's methodology in exercising its lawmaking function can
be characterized in terms of three models of lawmaking: lawmaking
38. See Bickel, supra note 31; cf. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CotUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
39. It is, of course, tempting to focus only on the Supreme Court because there are a limited
number of Supreme Court cases. Looking at the effect of Court doctrine is, quite simply, hard
work. See Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L.
REV. 745 (1983) . .
40. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective on the First Amendment, 84 CotUM. L. REv.
(forthcoming).
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by example, lawmaking by general principles, and lawmaking by specific
rules. The lines between these models are, of course, fuzzy, and no
opinion will have all of the characteristics of one model and none of
either of the others. Rather, every opinion will have at least some parts
of all three models, with varying emphasis among the three. But the
three styles, or approaches, are sufficiently different in focus that teasing
out the distinction seems useful, even though the result is a loose
categorization rather than a rigidly demarcated division.
Lawmaking by example is lawmaking in the adjudicative mode. In
this sense it is lawmaking in common law fashion. Cases are decided
on a more or less ad hoc basis, 41 and only after a number of cases
have been decided can we piece together broad principles to guide future
adjudication. Now, when the Supreme Court decides a case in this manner, it does not say that it is deciding by an ad hoc method. Nor does
it simply announce its result, without any reasons attached. Rather,
what characterizes a case that is decided in this mode is the particular
effort to limit the ruling to the facts of the case or to a quite narrow
class of cases with decidedly similar facts. When, in New York v.
Ferber, 42 Justice Stevens expressed a desire to decide the case on the
basis of the particular material and litigant before the Court, rather
than to articulate a broad rule, he was expressing a desire, at least
for the time being, to operate in this mode. The same desire is expressed
in Justice White's concurrence in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 43 in Justice Stewart's opinion in
Craig v. Boren, 44 in Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 45 and in many other cases. In all of these
the general perspective is the same. The Court, or some individual
Justice, perceives that the case can be decided on narrow grounds, and
thus uses those narrow grounds for reaching a particular result in the
particular case. At times the narrow grounds may be a function of
the factual peculiarities of the case at hand, as in Kassel and Min41. By "ad hoc" I mean that the agenda of adjudication is determined by the existence of
particular controversies at a quite low level, and the emergence of the controversy before the
courts is partly determined by factors over which the courts have no control, such as the absence
of settlement, the willingness of the parties to pursue the matter, the ability of the parties to
~fford counsel, and so on.
42. 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3365 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting first amendment attack on
a New York law designed to deal with child pornography by prohibiting the distribution of material
depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring the material to be legally obscene).
43. 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (holding invalid a Minnesota user
tax that applied only to large newspapers).
44. 429 U.S. 190, 214 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (invalidating statute
that allowed access to "near beer" to males of ages 18-20, but denies access to females of the
same ages).
45. 450 U.S. 662, 665-68 (1981) (invalidating Iowa statute that prohibited 65-foot double truck
units as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
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neapolis Star, and at times the narrow grounds may be a function of
the usability of an existing standard to decide the case at hand and
a reluctance to erect a new standard, as in Justice Stewart's opinion
in Craig v. Boren. Most often these two factors - factual peculiarities
and existing usable standards - will be intertwined, and thus presented
in the same case, or the same argument.
When the Court adjudicates in this style, it rejects a number of
possibilities for a broader decision. It rejects the possibility of creating
a new rule if this .case can be decided under an old one. It rejects the
possibility of dealing with yet to be presented hypothetical cases (usually
presented in "slippery slope" 46 fashion) if this case can be decided
without considering those cases, and it consequently rejects the possibility
of laying down broad general guidelines, choosing instead to decide
the case in the narrowest way possible. This approach is signaled by
the catch-phrase "but we need not reach that issue. here, " 47 or its
synonym "but we need not decide that question here. " 48 These and
similar phrases announce to the reader of the opinion that the Court
is going to decide as little as possible on this occasion.
An opinion that is issued in this fashion, complete with all the caveats,
qualifications, and disclaimers that festoon a narrowly decided case,
is, by virtue of its adjudicative bias, the least effective as a directive.
The greater the number of qualifications, the less the Court is saying.
And the more an opinion is limited to a relatively specific factual pattern, the less someone faced with a slightly different factual situation
can rely on what the Court has already said. To the extent that the
Court is cognizant of the fact that it hears only a limited number of
cases and must guide with respect even to those cases that it cannot
hear, 49 it will hesitate to rely too heavily on the adjudicative mode,
of making law by example only, and will be reluctant to refrain from
giving broad directives that govern and direct in a range of cases substantially broader than the one that, perhaps fortuitously, happens to be
before the Court.
46. There is an important distinction that should be noted here. At times hypotheticals are
presented to show the application of a putative rule to cases within the linguistic contours of
that rule. And at other times hypotheticals are presented that lie outside the putative rule, but
which, it is argued, represent realistic fears in terms of "the next step," or in terms of lower
court misapplication of the rule. A court that is attentive to its guidance function will consider
both possibilities. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-71 (G.
Gunther & F. Schauer Supp. 1983).
47. E.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 116 n.33 (1979); United
Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 153 n.13 (1977).
48. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2870 n.15 (1983); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 377 n.10 (1976).
49. See Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 808. The specific characterization of the "guidance"
function• is Professor Easterbrook's. Id. at 807.
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Implicit in the adjudicative mode is the assumption, suggested by
the name itself, that the range of problems is coextensive with the problems actually presented to the courts. But this assumption, when carefully considered, is strikingly at odds with the reality of human and judicial
behavior. 50 In many cases the existence of a judicial precedent will
forestall any litigation whatsoever; but it would be a mistake to assume
that the absence of litigation is, in this context, a sign that an underlying factual controversy did not or could not have existed.
Even the perspective that recognizes the effect of prior directives
on the present scope of legal controversies is focused far too narrowly,
because it ignores the enormous range of "legal events" that never
reach the lawyer's office. 51 To the extent that the law speaks with
moderate clarity over a wide range of events in which people normally
engage, the very clarity of the law, by preventing a controversy from
arising in the first instance, is as much a legal event as controversy
resulting from doubtful or unclear law. It is strange but true that many
are quite willing to take breaking the law but not following the law
as an example of what law is "all about." But it is, of course, not
true that there would be no law if there were no disobedience of law, 52
and thus the law serves an important function every time it channels
behavior from where it would have gone in the absence of legal
constraint.
The discontinuity between problems presented by discrete cases and
the range of potential problems is even greater in constitutional law,
because the selective process by which the Supreme Court decides which
cases to decide means that many cases will never reach the Court at
all. 53 Yet there is a great deal of law involved in those cases that do
not reach the Court, in those cases that never reach any court, and
in those cases that never go to the lawyers' offices at all. Every time
a police officer reads a Miranda warning exactly as it is on the card,
every time that officer goes off to get a warrant even though he is
absolutely sure that the search will yield the desired results, 54 every
time a prosecutor does not prosecute a Communist for the simple act
of being a Communist, 55 and every time a certain class of school

SO. See Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement
Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAW & Soc. REv. 91, 99-100 (1978).
51. For an expanded version of this point, see Schauer, supra note 15.
s2: Indeed, to Bentham the ideal sanction was one that would never have to be imposed,
and thus the ideal legal system would contain numerous but never-used sanctions. J. BENTHAM,
OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H. Hart ed. 1970).
53. .But see supra note 5.
54. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
55. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961).
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districts does not create a separate school for blacks, 56 the Supreme
Court's lawmaking function has operated as it should. Yet it is silly
to suppose that the urges to engage in constitutionally relevant behavior
can neatly coincide with the desire of the Supreme Court, or any court,
to hear and decide the case. Thus, there will be instances in which
guidance from the Court on the basis of previous cases will be desirable.
But if the previous case says nothing except what is narrowly relevant
to that case, the case will be ineffective lawmaking in the sense I am
using the term. When no law is made, but when the factual situation
arises, there is a void, with its consequent uncertainty. To the extent
that the Court anticipates this problem, and is thus willing to write
more than needed for a minimal rational explanation of the result, 57
it prevents problems from arising; and in that sense it makes law
effectively.
Despite this, an argument in favor of a narrow and extensively
qualified opinion relates to the Court's raw political power and
theoretical legitimacy. The same reasons that might lead the Court to
decline to decide a case could also lead it to decide the case as narrowly
as possible. 58 To the extent that the Court decides too much, it may
weaken its ability to decide when it really matters. 59 And if there are
questions of legitimacy with respect to every exercise of judicial review, 60
then each case before the Court presents, pro tanto, a good reason
for deciding the case as narrowly as possible.
Not only is this not the place to present counterarguments to these
pervasive concerns, but I have no inclination to do so. That there are
concerns that cut in the opposite direction does not indicate that these
concerns are not legitimate. But there is a difference between what
is a good argument, or reason, and what is, all things considered, the
course of action to follow. Every argument for not deciding a case,
or for deciding it as narrowly as possible, is not diminished by the
presence of arguments that would militate in the opposite direction
when deciding what, all things considered, to do. The values motivating
arguments against the adjudicative mode and in favor of greater
acknowledgment of the lawmaking function are often ignored as important factors that should be considered in this ultimate inquiry. But
in arguing that these factors ought to be taken into account more often,
56. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. What counts as a "minimal rational explanation" is an extremely difficult and complex
issue, but in this context such a discussion would be .superfluous. All I am saying is that it is
possible, and often desirable, for the Court to be quite detailed about its reasoning. See Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 808.
58. See Gunther, supra note 38.
59. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
60. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981).
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I am not arguing that they can or should be often or even sometimes
dispositive.
·
Alternatively, it might be argued that decisions rendered more broadly
than is required by the facts of the case are decisions that are rendered
against the background of an insufficient record. In refusing to qualify
an opinion narrowly, the Court is in effect deciding cases not then
before it and might be only guessing about the factual setting of such
cases. The concern over the Court's elaboration of broad directives
applicable to an undetermined range of future cases, which is not the
same as a general desire for case-by-case adjudication, 61 is premised
on the assumption that it is easier to decide cases in a concrete setting
than it is to decide them based on speculation about what khid of factual setting might be presented. 62 But this assumption is only as valid
as the gap between the factual speculation and factual reality. To the
extent that the Court is deciding in advance controversies that have
not and will not occur, and failing to decide actual controversies, there
are indeed special dangers involved in deciding in advance of the controversy itself. But to the extent that anticipatory adjudication accurately
reflects and predicts a future but real state of affairs, the disadvantages of anticipatory adjudication decrease. Thus, if lower court litigation and extensive familiarity with certain fact patterns enable the Court
to know the types of cases that are likely to arise, this particular objection to broadly sweeping opinions is blunted~ But if the novelty of
the issues is such that there is truly grave doubt about the future, then
there are substantial problems with deciding cases that might never
have to be decided.
Finally, it is possible that opinions that are too unqualified will reduce
the Court's own flexibility in deciding those cases in the future that
cannot currently ·even be anticipated. Unlike the problem discussed just
previously, here we are not concerned with the type of case that can
be anticipated as a problem. A thorough search of both the lower court
cases and the imaginations of the Justices might still omit some case
that will arise despite a total inability to predict that that will happen.
Indeed, it is not just a matter of "might," for the phenomenon of
open texture 63 is an inevitable and irremovable feature of the legal

61. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. Cr. REv.
285, 297 n.6S.
62. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
63. I use "open texture" in its strict philosophical sense, not as a synonym for "vagueness;"
Thus, "open texture" refers to the possibility that any term, or rule, no matter how specific,
might under some currently unimaginable state of affairs present a difficult question of application. See Waismann, Verifiability, in Lome ANO LANGUAGE (FIRST SERIES) 120-21 (A. Flew ed.
1952); see also H. HART, supra note 6, at 121-32.
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condition. 64 For example, it was virtually impossible for the Court,
at the time it decided Brown v. Board of Education, 65 to have predicted
the entire range of issues subsequently presented by affirmative
action and racial line-drawing for noninvidious 66 purposes. At the time
the Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio, 67 it certainly did not and probably could not have imagined the range of issues, arguably in tension
with Brandenburg, raised by the litigation involving The Progressive. 68
And it seems unlikely that the decision and language in Ex parte
McArdle 69 were informed by a knowledge of the issues now being raised
in connection with the use of the "exceptions and regulations" power
in Article III to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction for reasons based
on objections to specific rulings by the Court. 70
The problem in these and many other cases is not that the Court
did not think hard enough. A crafty law professor with a host of bizarre
hypotheticals would not have enabled the Court to anticipate what
evaded it. 11 Regardless of how much care is devoted to thinking of
possible ramifications of a decision, something new can and usually
will occur that goes well beyond the range of plausible contemplation
at the time the first decision was rendered.
In the face of this problem, it is possible that a lack of a safety
valve or escape route in the first opinion will, when the new situation
arises, increase the probability of tension between the opinions. If we
expect the Court's decisions to be principled, following the rules set
forth in earlier cases to the extent that those rules, on their face, govern
the next case, 12 then is it not wise for the Court to refuse to fetter
itself in the first case? Should it not decide the first case as narrowly
as possible in order to maintain maximum flexibility to deal with the
unforeseen?
·
To the extent that we are dealing here with the truly unforeseen and
unforeseeable, such a strategy seems partly unattainable and partly un64. See H. HART, supra note 6, at 125-26.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
68. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (\V.D. Wis. 1979), mandamus denied
sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv.
265, 297-99 (1981).
69. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court derives
from the Constitution and not from Congress).
70. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Canstitutional Limita•
tions on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 17 (1981).
71. See supra note 46.
72. See generally Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CouJM.
L. R.Ev. 35 (1963); Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM.
L. REv. 982 (1978). Both of the foregoing refine the notions in Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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necessary. The goal is unattainable because the unforeseeable is just
that - unforeseeable. If we are to plan for the unforeseeable, we are,
in effect, destining ourselves to paralysis. Any decision, however narrow, is potentially in tension with what might be necessary under some
as yet unimaginable set of facts. To plan for such a consequence would
involve decisions that totally abdicated any pretense at a lawmaking
function and dealt with everything on a case-by-case basis. Moreover,
such an approach is unnecessary, because it cannot plausibly be contended that the goals of precedent, stare decisis, and principled adjudication are absolute mandates. 73 Should the truly unforeseen arise,
then the Court can simply acknowledge the force of precedent while
at the same time holding that the facts now presented are sufficiently
novel and compelling that the mandate of the rule articulated iri the
earlier case will not be followed. Indeed, it is commonly acknowledged
that stare decisis means less in the context of constitutional adjudication than it does in other contexts. 74 But that does not mean that it has
no function whatsoever. Principles, including the principle of stare
decisis, can still be effective even though they are not absolute or may
vary in strength. 75 But once we recognize that the Court has the power,
ex post facto, to engraft exceptions onto previously unqualified
language, then there is no reason to suppose that allowing for the
possibility of the unforeseen means that every decision of the Court
must be narrowly constrained by exceptions, qualifications, caveats,
and escape clauses. And if this is the case, then the argument from
unforeseen facts and issues is ineffective in blunting the force of the
argument for greater attention to the Court as lawmaker.
G'

VI.

Lawmaking by general principles, the second model of opinion
writing, is in sharp contrast to lawmaking by example, the adjudicative
model just discussed. The adjudicative model starts with extremely narrow decisions and generates broad principles only over time, as certain
regularities can be identified running through the narrow decisions.
But lawmaking by general principles operates in exactly the opposite
way. Here the Court starts with very broad and majestic statements,
seemingly all-encompassing, and then narrows these principles as it proceeds to decide further cases arising under the principle.
This model, at least in terms of authoritative statutory texts, is an
established feature of American legal life. Lawmaking by general prin73. See Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 992-94.
74. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
See generally Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1979).
15. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 22-28.
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ciples is a reasonably accurate characterization of constitutional adjudication under quite broad and abstract constitutional clauses, and
it is also characteristic of adjudication under such general nonconstitutional instruments as the Sherman Antitrust Act76 and Section lO(b)
(and Rule lOb-5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.77
In the examples just mentioned, the abstract statement has its origin
in a statutory (or constitutional) text. But it is possible for the Court
to operate in the same way in rendering its opinions. The Court's
excessively expansive statements in Shelley v. Kraemer, 78 Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 19 and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District, 80 for example, can be taken as instances of a strategy
of whittling rather than building. For rather than constructing a precise
principle out of small parts, the Court here is starting with a very large
block and then whittling it down to size, just as it does under most
constitutional provisions and a number of statutes.
As with lawmaking by specific examples in the adjudicative model,
this approach is not without its distinctive advantages. It allows the
Court to perform an important function as the expositor of broad
values, 81 and it also provides at the same time most of the advantages
of open-endedness that were discussed with reference to the adjudicative
model. But just as this model shares many of the advantages of the
adjudicative model, it also shares most of its weaknesses. For an opinion that is excessively expansive provides little, if any, more guidance
than does an opinion that is excessively narrow. A lower court or other
party that must apply a Supreme Court opinion to new facts is not
likely to receive much guidance if the law that it must apply is presented
in terms of little more specificity than "privacy," 82 "fundamental
fairness," 83 "minimum contacts," 84 or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. m, I am not saying that such emotive generalities serve
76. 15 U.S.C. § I (1982).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1983).
78. 334 U.S. I (1948) (stating that state enforcement of private discriminatory choices is state
action).
79. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (stating that wealth is a suspect classification under the equal
protection clause).
80. 439 U.S. 410, 413-16 (1979) (stating that the text of the first amendment precludes
distinguishing between public and private speech).
81. Whether the Court does or can serve as a significant educational force in American life
is an important question that deserves careful consideration. As a hypothesis, it seems likely
that decisions such as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), serve to create public values as much
as if not more than they reflect such values. This theme js dominant in the thinking of the Scandinavian Realists, particularly w. LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING REv!sED (1956).
82. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 515 (1981).
84. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
85. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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no purpose in constitutional adjudication. The broad ideas suggested
by such vague phrases can .and do serve over time as significant
touchstones to remind us of the importance of certain values, and are
implicit statements of the priority of certain values. But such phrases,
however powerful they are for some purposes, provide little comfort
for the conscientious judge, legislator, or public employee who is uncertain about how to decide a concrete case before him.
When Congress enacts legislation in the broad and vague style of
the Sherman Act, it can be interpreted as having delegated to the courts
the task of developing a body of concrete rules and principles to govern
actual cases. And it has at the same time declined to perform that
very task itself. Similarly, when the Supreme Court decides a case by
reference only to such general standards, it can be taken to have
delegated to some other body86 the task of working out the specifics.
This delegation, which might under some circumstances amount to abdication, is not necessarily wrong, but it is a denial of the guidance
and lawmaking function. Under some circumstances this may be the
appropriate course, but it seems likely that this model is often used
without a full appreciation of its implications in terms of the Court's
lawmaking function.
VII.
The final model I wish to discuss is lawmaking by specific rules.
This is the model that most closely resembles lawmaking by a legislative
body in the "normal" manner, where quite specific guidance is given
on how certain transactions should be dealt with. This is the model
of Miranda, of Miller, and of any opinion that promulgates a specific
test, usually one with three parts. 87 Some of these tests are of course
more specific than others. The tests that the Court has set forth with
respect to gender discrimination, 88 commercial speech, 89 tenth amendment limitations on congressional action, 90 and incidental restrictions
on speech,9 1 for example, are all directed primarily to lower court judges
making legal determinations, and they are all, as a result, not enormously specific. Other tests, such as the obscenity test in Miller, and
the defamation standards in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 92 and
86. Most commonly, but not necessarily, that body will be a lower court. But it could be
an administrative agency, the executive, or a legislature.
87. Because all of the present Justices have at one time been law students, it is not surprising
that they have retained the law student's love for three-part tests.
88. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
89. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 551 (1980) ..
90. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
91. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 93 seem directed primarily towards juries, 94
and are consequently more specific. And tests that are directed immediately towards the citizen or the public official may be still more
specific.
But relative specificity is in some ways a side issue. For although
the Court may at times be more or less successful in promulgating·
specific rules, its attempt to promulgate such rules is evidence of the
Court's cognizance of its lawmaking function. It is certainly fashionable
in academic circles to mock specific tests, suggesting that perhaps there
is more of the Realist in most of us than we would wish to admit, 95
but exactly the same criticism could be leveled against a legislature.
Once we realize that any court, and most especially the Supreme Court,
is in the business of making law to be applied by others, the same
standards that apply to legislative lawmaking can and should be applied
to Supreme Court lawmaking. And if it is therefore appropriate to
urge that legislatures act with some specificity, then so, too, it is appropriate to suggest that the Supreme Court should also act with some
specificity, writing opinions that contain the kinds of specific rules,
standards, and tests that can be most helpful in applying the opinion
to a wide range of specific instances not before the Supreme Court
when it set forth the standard.
When the Court is acting in this manner, one frequently sees the
complaint that this is an example of judicial legislation, which is then
taken as persuasive evidence that the Court is acting illegitimately. 96
That is, if the Court produces a result that contains a test so specific
that it looks legislative, then the charge is made that a legislature is
the more appropriate body to make decisions of that type and that.
therefore the Court is exceeding its authority. But this argument is simply
a non sequitur. That a court, aware of its responsibility to guide other
courts and other actors and entities, attempts to guide in a meaningful
way implies nothing about the circumstances that justified its entry
into the enterprise in the first place. What makes Roe v. Wade 91 to
many 98 an illegitimate exercise of judicial power is not that the Court
attempted to provide quite specific guidance to legislatures on what
types of restrictions are permissible. 99 For its critics, Roe would have
93. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
94. In both obscenity and defamation cases the standard to be applied is a constitutionally
based one and thus requires judicial determination as well.
95. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note I.
96. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP.
CT. REV. 159.
99. See 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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been equally illegitimate had it concluded its decision with an amor:..
phous mandate prohibiting unreasonable restriction on a woman's right
to have an abortion. 100 The standards that emerged from New York
Times Co. v. Sul/ivan 101 are every bit as specific as those that emerged
from Roe, yet to call New York Times an illegitimate exercise of judicial
power or an unauthorized encroachment on the judicial function seems
quite simply bizarre. 102 Conversely, Lochner v. New York, 103 the standard example of judicial encroachment on the legislative sphere, is no
less illegitimate because the Court there did not specify with precision
the exact contours of the freedom to contract, nor promulgate a threepart test to determine what future legislative actions would be struck
down as violative of the freedom.
VIII.
I have thus far argued that there are three models of judicial lawmaking, lawmaking by example, lawmaking by general principles, and
· lawmaking by specific rules, and that the third of these is vastly superior
to the first two in terms of the Court's responsibility to guide others.
I have also suggested that the advantages of the other two models,
however legitimate they may be, are insufficient to justify total abdication of the lawmaking function by the Supreme Court. But if there
are strong reasons that cut against an excessive concern with the Court's
lawmaking and guidance_function, then we should try to identify those
factors that might be of importance in deciding how crucial the lawmaking function is in a given instance.
The most important factor to be considered is the nature of those
who are to be guided. At times, as in most first amendment and equal
protection cases, the Court will primarily be guiding lower courts. The
same can be said for much of its work in the procedural area. 104 And
when the nature of the subject matter is such that the Court's directives are aimed at other courts, the mandates can arguably be tailored
to the presumed expertise of the courts that are to follow those mandates. Thus, in these instances a moderately general standard, or test,
. 100. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2504 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
102. I am not saying that New York Times is clearly correct, although I think it is. Rather,

I am saying that decisions relating to interpreting the mandates of the first amendment in light
of political speech are plainly legitimate.
103. 198 U.S. 45 (190S).
104. I am referring here primarily to constitutional restraints on civil procedure, including
restraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (194S), and limitations on prejudgment remedies, see North ·aeorgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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may be sufficient, requiring the exercise of some judgment as that standard or test is applied to particular facts. This is what courts do all
the time, and there may be no need, or at least less need, to provide
a very specific and mechanical formula that removes all judgment from
the lower court. 105 .
This is not to say that the Court could not still be unsuccessful in
guiding lower courts. When the Supreme Court's standards are simply
confusing, or inconsistent, or so abstract as to be useless, then the
Court has not succeeded in guiding even other courts, and it is properly criticized on these grounds. 106 But if the Court's standards are
internally consistent, comprehensible, and sufficiently specific to channel
decisions in a particular direction, then the lack of precision ought
not by itself to be taken as an occasion for criticism. To say that the
Supreme Court should guide lower courts is not to say that it should
totally preempt their function.
At other times the Court is speaking directly to legislatures. In Immigration~ and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 101 for example, the
Court is quite simply telling Congress how, in a procedural sense, to
legislate. In some respects Chadha is an excellent illustration of the
theme of this Article, because the Court decided the two-house veto
situation in the context of a one-house veto case. Thus, the decision
was broader than necessary, but for that very reason it will be quite
effective as a guide to Congress. 108 Although Congress and the
legislatures of the states undoubtedly have legions of lawyers to interpret Supreme Court opinions for them, much of the guidance can be
conceived of as direct. We do not wish the legislatures to have to wonder
constantly about whether their legislation is going to be struck down
by the courts, and there are thus important advantages to bypassing
the lower courts and talking directly to the concerned party, the
legislature. This may at times require greater specificity, but there is
the dear advantage of reducing the incidence of judicial-legislative confrontations, an advantage that parallels many of the reasons for deciding
a case narrowly. Thus, it is not so clear that arguments about the limitations on the judicial function always militate in favor of the narrow
and highly qualified opinion. To the extent that a broad but clear opinion reduces future exercises of judicial power, it may in the long run
be more attentive to limitations on the judicial function than a nar-

10S. It is, after all, impossible to come up with a "perfect code" that could "govern all
possible combinations of circumstances." G. GoTTI.IEB, supra note 23, at 16.
106. This is the nature of the criticism in Corr, supra note 39.
107. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
108. I am not saying that Chadha has foreclosed every possible issue relating to the matters
it decided, but only that it did foreclose a range of issues very likely to be raised.
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rower decision that virtually guarantees continuing litigation and continuing confrontations between courts and legislatures.
Finally, there are some decisions that speak directly to the individuals
concerned. As I have emphasized, Miranda exemplifies this type of
decision, but the same phenomenon appears in Connick v. Myers, 109
in which the Court is speaking directly to governmental supervisors. 110
Where it is likely that the Cpurt's mandates will have this kind of pervasive impact on a day-to-day basis, speaking directly to the parties
concerned has distinct advantages, and it is in this situation where the
advantages of greatest specificity are most apparent.
Another important factor that should be considered in deciding what
type of decision to issue is the frequency of the likely occurrence of
the situation. To the extent that the frequency of the occurrence of
the situation before the Court is rare, the advantages of lawmaking
by specific rule are minimal. For the very rareness of the situation
makes it much more likely that every or at least most future instances
can be reviewed by the Supreme Court, or at least some other appellate
court. In these circumstances the guidance function can properly be
subordinated to other concerns. But to the extent that the situation
is extremely common, as is the case with arrests, searches and seizures,
and so on, then the possibility of continuing judicial supervision, refinement and reevaluation is nonexistent. Here the Supreme Court, or any
appellate court, can hear only a tiny percentage of the number of instances of application. As a result, the guidance function becomes of
great importance, almost to the point of becoming the most significant factor in formulating an opinion. '
Related to the frequency with which the situation arises is the question of the costs of a lack of or delay of Supreme Court review. If
the issue is one that has significant consequences to many people or
to large programs, and is one that is being frequently litigated in lower
courts, clear guidance seems imperative. In issues related to school
financing, 111 for example, there seems to be little excuse to let major
decisions about large expenditures affecting· millions of people remain
in a state of continuing uncertainty. But where the underlying circumstances are less momentous, and where delay is less troublesome,
some uncertainty pending frequent Supreme Court review may be a
more acceptable price to pay for the advantages of delaying decisons.

109. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (holding that discharge of an assistant district attorney for circulating a questionnaire that only minimally addressed issues of public interest did not violate
claimant's first amendment rights).
110. Whether the Court's "matter of public concern" standard will be workable is a separate
question.
111. What, for example, are the states to do in the wake of Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct.
3062 (1983)?
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IX.
The ideas presented in this Article have been tentative, exploratory,
and intentionally vague. I did not intend to offer much concrete
guidance, a luxury I have because no one has entrusted me with the
power of making law. But whether we wish to admit it ex·plicitly or
not, we have granted the Supreme Court that power, and thus we have
a right to expect of it more guidance and more attention to the needs
of those who must follow its lead. The Court's decisions should be
evaluated not only in terms of whether they are correct or incorrect,
legitimate or illegitimate, but also in terms of whether they are usable
by others. Performing this evaluation is perhaps less flashy than broadside criticism of results, but it may have much greater importance. It
may be too much to expect that the Court will always reach the "correct" result, but it is not too much to expect that the Court will at
least always perform its functions ~ith care. One of those functions
is that of guiding others, and it is a function that deserves much closer
attention.

